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Abstract
Language is an imperfect and coarse means of communicating information about a com-
plex and nuanced world. We report on an experiment designed to capture this feature
of communication. The messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state
of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the
complexity or elaborateness of the message. Here the sender learns the state of the world
then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and provides a
best guess about the state. The incentives of the players are aligned in the sense that both
sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the receivers
guess. We nd that the size of the language endogenously emerges as a function of the
costs of communication. Specically, we nd that higher communication costs are associ-
ated a smaller language. Although the equilibrium predictions do not perform well, this
divergence occurs in a manner which is consistent with the experimental communication
literature: overcommunication. We nd that the senders payo¤s relative to equilibrium
payo¤s are decreasing in the cost of communication. We also nd that the receivers pay-
o¤s relative to equilibrium payo¤s are increasing in the cost of communication. Finally,
we nd imperfections in coordination on the basis of the experimental labels.
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1 Introduction
The properties of words are very di¤erent from the properties of real numbers. For instance, it
is not the case that there exists a word with a meaning between any two words. However, words
are used to construct statements which convey information about a complex and nuanced
reality. One can use words to express more detailed and nuanced information, but only
at a cost to the sender. It is our view that language is an imperfect and coarse means of
communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We report on an experiment
designed to capture this feature of communication. In our experiment, the language available
to the sender imperfectly describes the state of the world. By this, we mean that the sender
cannot fully and costlessly communicate. However the sender can improve communication,
at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message.
By way of example, suppose that your advisee has been invited to present at a conference.
Your preferences and the preferences of your advisee are identical with regards to her perfor-
mance at the conference: to sound competent, to receive helpful comments, etc. In order
to facilitate this success, you wish to provide her with information about how to best have a
successful conference. However, there is not a single word to convey the full extent of your
knowledge regarding how best to present, how best to prepare the slides, how best to respond
to potential questions, etc. You can increase the amount of information conveyed only by
constructing additional statements. As a result, you are unlikely to communicate all of the
relevant information. Further, the amount of information which you provide will be related
to the costs which you bear in the construction of the statements.
Hertel and Smith (2012) provide a theoretical account of such communication by adapting
the uniform-quadratic version of Crawford and Sobel (1982) so that messages available to the
sender are constrained to be costly and discrete. Although there are many equilibria, the
authors employ an out-of-equilibrium condition which identies the equilibria with the largest
possible number of transmitted messages, which we refer to as most informative. The paper
makes the prediction that more costly signals will be conserved (sent on smaller regions of the
state space) and that the size of the language used will emerge in equilibrium.
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We design an experiment in order to investigate communication in the Hertel and Smith
setting. The questions are then, how does the most informative equilibrium identied by
Hertel and Smith (2012) perform in the laboratory, and, as predicted by Hertel and Smith
(2012), does the size of the language emerge as a function of the communication costs.
In this experiment, the subjects are anonymously divided into pairs, one as a sender and
one as a receiver. The sender learns the state of the world then sends a message to the
receiver. The receiver observes the message and selects an action which a¤ects the payo¤s
of both players. The incentives of the players are aligned in the sense that both sender and
receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the receivers action. In
our experiment, messages imperfectly describe to the underlying state space. Specically,
due to the constraints of the message space, the sender is not able to fully and costlessly
communicate. However, the sender is able to transmit more information by constructing an
elaborate, but costly, message.
Here the state space is an integer between  3 and 3. The sender can send a costless
message, which we refer to as the "Empty" message.1 Additionally, the sender can compose a
costly message consisting of two possible elements "High" and "Low." These message elements
would seem to provide a natural ordering given our state space. The cost of a message is then
a function of the number of elements in the message. Therefore, the empty message can be
transmitted at a cost of 0; the messages "High" and "Low" can be transmitted at a cost of c;
and the messages "High High," "High Low," "Low High" and "Low Low" can be transmitted
at a cost of 2c, where we vary c.
We nd that the size of the language emerges endogenously as a function of the costs of
communication. On the other hand, we nd that the equilibrium predictions do not per-
form well. However, our experimental observations di¤er from the theoretical predictions
in a manner consistent with other experimental communication papers: the senders are over-
communicating. Previous experimental communication papers have found that senders often
1Throughout the paper we describe the costless message as empty rather than the condition of having not
sent a message. This is because, it might not be easy to distinguish between the case where the sender decided
not to send a message and the case where the sender has not yet sent a message. To rule out this confusion we
describe the costless message as empty.
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communicate more information than that which is in their best interest. In our setting, this
would imply that the senders are not su¢ ciently a¤ected by the communication costs. One
way in which overcommunication could be detected would be the observation of a suboptimal
relationship between changes in communication costs and changes in behavior. We nd that
the senders payo¤s relative to the equilibrium payo¤s are decreasing in the cost of commu-
nication. However, we nd that the receivers payo¤s relative to the equilibrium payo¤s are
increasing in the cost of communication. Finally, we nd imperfections in coordination on
the basis of the labels within our setting. In particular, we nd that subjects are better able
to coordinate on some states than others, despite that there does not exist an a priori reason
to expect such di¤erences.
2 Related Literature
There is a literature which tests existing communication models, in general, and the Crawford
and Sobel (1982) model, in particular. Perhaps the rst paper testing Crawford and Sobel
was Dickhaut et al. (1995) whereas more recent examples include Cai and Wang (2006) and
Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009). Due to the limited ability of subjects to nd complex equilibria
in novel situations, testing communication equilibria typically uses simplied versions of the
model. A natural way to accomplish this simplication is to specify the state space as a set
of integers rather than the unit interval. For instance, Dickhaut et al. species the state
space as the integers between 1 and 4 and Cai and Wang species the state space as the odd
integers between 1 and 9. We select a state space as the set of integers between  3 and 3 in
order to render the signal elements of "High" and "Low" relatively meaningful. This would
seem to aid in the coordination problem2 between the sender and receiver. Also note that in
Dickhaut et al. (1995), Cai and Wang (2006), and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009) the set of
costless messages is larger than the state space. By contrast, this is not the case in our paper.
Experimental studies of cheap talk communication nd that the senders often overcommu-
2Prior work nds that subjects can resolve similar coordination problems (Blume et al., 1998, 2001; Blume
and Gneezy, 2000; Kreps, 1990). However this is not the focus of our paper.
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nicate.3 Specically, these studies nd that in a cheap talk setting where senders and receives
do not have aligned preferences, the senders often communicate more information than that
which is in their best interest. Also, there is a literature which nds that subjects can have
an aversion to lying.4 Again, these ndings can be interpreted as overcommunication by the
senders. Note that our subjects never have an incentive to mislead the sender because the
sender and receiver have identical preferences over the action of the receiver.
Despite the obvious di¤erences, we can apply the general principle of overcommunication
to our setting. Are senders communicating more information than that which is in their best
interest? In our experiment, senders can communicate an excessive amount of information by
not su¢ ciently responding to the costs of communication. Although our environment is quite
di¤erent from those found in the literature, we also nd that the senders overcommunicate.
In our setting, while the senders are sensitive to the costs of communication, they are not
su¢ ciently sensitive. Given that we observe similar behavior in such di¤erent settings, we
argue that overcommunication is a robust experimental phenomenon.
3 Equilibrium Predictions
Recall that our state space is s 2 f 3;  2;  1; 0; 1; 2; 3g. Our message space is m 2
? [ ([2i=1fHigh; Lowgi). The communication costs c(m) are a function of the number of
elements transmitted. The message without an element (Empty message) costs c(m) = 0,
a message with a single element costs c(m) = c, a message with two elements costs costs
c(m) = 2c. The receiver has an action space of a 2 f 3; 2:5;  2;  1:5;  1; 0:5; 0; 0:5; 1;
1:5; 2; 2:5; 3g. Both the sender and receiver prefer the receiver to select the action as close to
the state as possible. Specically, the payo¤ to the receiver is the nonnegative integer closest
to:
UR = 100  25(a  s)2. (1)
3For example, see Cai and Wang (2006) and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009).
4For instance, Gneezy (2005), Hurkens and Kartik (2009), and Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007, 2009).
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The payo¤ to the sender is the integer closest to:
US = UR   c(m). (2)
Hertel and Smith (2012) characterize the equilibria.5 The authors show that in any
equilibrium, messages are sent on adjacent states and the empty message must be sent on at
least one state. As mentioned previously, there are many equilibria in our setup. We now
discuss the most informative equilibria.
For c 2 [0; 12:5] then any fully revealing equilibria will exist. In other words, each of the 7
messages are transmitted on one of the 7 states. Further, each permutation of messages and
states can form an equilibrium. For c 2 (12:5; 25] then fully revealing equilibria will still exist,
however it cannot be that messages on adjacent states have a di¤erence in communication costs
of 2c. In each these fully revealing equilibria, the ex-ante payo¤s are identical: the expected
payo¤ for the receiver in each equilibria is EUR = 100 and the expected payo¤ for the sender
in each equilibria is EUS = EUR   107 c.
For c 2 [25; 94], the messages "High" and "Low" are each sent on 2 adjacent states and
the empty message is sent on 3 adjacent states. We also note that the messages with two
elements are not used. The expected payo¤ of the receiver is EUR = 1007 + 2  757 + 4  947 .
The expected payo¤ for the sender is EUS = EUR   47c.
For c 2 [94; 100], the messages "High" and "Low" are each sent on the extreme states, 3
and  3. Here the messages with two elements are not used. The empty message is sent on
the remaining states. Given the empty message, the receiver is indi¤erent between selecting
 0:5 and 0:5. The expected payo¤ to the receiver is EUR = 2  947 + 2  447 + 2  1007 . The
expected payo¤ to the sender is EUS = EUR   27c. Note that the receiver is indi¤erent
between selecting  0:5 and 0:5 but not 0. If the sender is pooling on more than 3 states,
the expected payo¤ of selecting  0:5 or 0:5 is 2  947 + 2  447 = 2867 and the expected payo¤ of
selecting 0 is 1007 + 2  757 = 2507 . Therefore, selecting an integer action yields a slightly lower
5See Hertel and Smith (2012) for further discussion of the modeling choices. For reasons which are specied
in their paper, Hertel and Smith assume that each message has a unique cost of transmission. This would
seem to be less natural in an experimental setting.
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payo¤.
For c > 100, the only equilibria is one in which the sender exclusively sends the empty
message for all states. The receiver has no additional information about the state and is
therefore indi¤erent among selecting  1:5;  0:5; 0:5, and 1:5. The expected payo¤s are then
EUR = EUS = 2  947 + 2  447 .
4 Experimental Design
A total of 48 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were undergraduate or
graduate students at Rutgers University-Camden. The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions lasted from 90 to 120
minutes.
In each period, the sender was shown the state, which we referred to as the "secret number."
The state s consisted of an integer between  3 and 3. In order to inform the receiver of its
content, the sender was able to transmit a possibly costly message. The message "Empty"
costs c(m) = 0, the messages "High" and "Low" each cost c(m) = c, the messages "High
High," "High Low," "Low High," and "Low Low," each cost c(m) = 2c, where c 2 f10; 30; 50;
96g. Upon observing the message, the receiver selected a best guess about the state. The
receivers action a was selected from the action space of half integers between  3 and 3.
The per period payo¤ to the receiver was the nonnegative integer closest to 100 25(a s)2.
The per period payo¤ to the sender was the receivers payo¤s minus c(m). The sender and
receiver were each given 30 seconds in which to make a decision. In order to facilitate their
understanding of the setting, the subjects were given a table indicating the payo¤s associated
with each state and action selected by the receiver.6 The subjects were given a $5 show up
fee and $1 for every 300 points accumulated.7
Sender and receiver were matched and played the game for 15 periods where c was held
xed. A complete history within each match was available to both sender and receiver. See
Appendix A for the screen shot of both the sender and the receiver. After the 15 periods,
6This table is provided in Appendix A.
7The total amount earned in the experiment ranged from $6:29 to $20:54, with an average of $15:62.
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each subject was rematched with a di¤erent opponent, each switched their role (sender or
receiver), and played with a new value of c. Each session consisted of 4 rounds of 15 periods.
The subjects were made aware of these matching procedures. Each subject experienced only
one of two sequences of communication costs. One sequence was ordered 10-50-30-96 and the
other was ordered 96-30-50-10. We ran two sessions which consisted of 8 subjects and two
sessions of 16 subjects. Therefore, we have a total of 1440 data points for both senders and
receivers.
A few comments on our experimental design are in order. Since we expected overcom-
munication, even though only the senders incurred the communication costs, we designed the
experiment to reduce the social preferences of the sender towards the receiver. First, the
payo¤s of both sender and receiver were displayed to both players in each period. In this
way, the sender might act less generously if the receiver and sender outcomes are su¢ ciently
inequitable. Second, we emphasized the anonymous matching whereby after each round of
15 periods, the players would be rematched with a new partner. This was done in order to
discourage any implicit reciprocal play.
Additionally, many experimental communication papers rematch the subjects after each
period. However, we decided not to rematch, as there is a reasonably di¢ cult coordination
problem which would be aggravated by rematching after every period. For these reasons,
despite our xed matching protocol, we also do not expect repeated game e¤ects to be present.
However, we expect the xed matching to yield better coordination outcomes.
Finally, note that we constrain the receivers payo¤s to be nonnegative. This experimental
feature was designed to make the payo¤s easier to understand, and to avoid negative payo¤s
for the receiver. Although this would a¤ect the babbling equilibrium, we did not expect that
we would observe this behavior in the laboratory. We also note that only a small fraction
of outcomes would be a¤ected by the choice to constrain the receivers payo¤s to be greater
than or equal to 0. Only 14.75% (59 of 384) of actions in periods 1-4 and 8.36% (92 of
1056) in periods 5-15 would have produced a negative receiver payo¤, had we not censored
the receivers payo¤s at 0.
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There are interesting questions related to the di¤erences in the meaning of the messages
within a match and whether these change across matches.8 However, our experimental
setup is not designed to investigate these issues. First, within each match, a particular
state only occurs a few times. Further, each subject only plays the game with a particular
communication cost during a single round. As a result, our experimental setup does not
facilitate the investigation of these interesting questions.
Finally, we selected the communication costs in order observe behavior possibly ranging
from full communication to virtually no communication. For a number of reasons we selected
both c = 30 and 50, despite that their equilibrium predictions are identical. First, we did
not want only a single value between the highest and lowest communication costs. Second,
although the equilibrium predictions are identical, it was not clear that behavior would be
identical. Additionally, we wanted to use 4 values of communication costs, in order to balance
the experiment such that each subject played as sender with two communication costs and as
receiver with two communication costs.
5 Results
5.1 Overview of Data
First, we investigate whether the order of the sequences of communication costs a¤ect the
earnings of the sender. We perform a regression with sender payo¤s as the dependent vari-
able. To account for the fact that not every match observes the same sequence of states, the
independent variables include the cost of communication, a dummy indicating one of the two
sequence orders, the communication cost-order interaction, and dummy variables accounting
for the state.9 We nd that neither the order dummy (p = 0:81) nor the communication
cost-order interaction (p = 0:54) are signicant. As a result, we do not nd evidence that the
order of the communication costs a¤ect the behavior of the senders.
We also investigate whether there is learning across the 15 periods within each round.
8For instance, Weber and Camerer (2003).
9These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Across all rounds, the relationship between the senders payo¤s and the period in which it
was obtained is signicant (p = 0:01).10 However, within periods 5-15, the relationship is not
signicant (p = 0:7). Therefore, for the bulk of the analysis, within each round we exclude
from consideration the data obtained in periods 1-4.
Finally, we provide a summary of the raw data in Appendix B. In particular, there we
provide the distribution of the senders messages for each state and each of the four possible
communication costs. We also provide the distribution of receivers actions for each of the
messages and each of the four possible communication costs.
5.2 Size of the Language Used
We ask whether the size of the language arises endogenously as a function of the cost of
communication. In other words, are expensive signals conserved when communication is
costly? The raw data provided in Appendix B suggest that expensive signals are conserved.
However, to address whether this impression is correct, we run logistic regressions with three
di¤erent measures of the size of the language. In the rst specication, the dependent variable
is a dummy indicating whether the message had one or two elements. We assign a value of
1 in the event that the message had either one or two elements, and 0 otherwise. We refer
to this regression as "One or Two." In the second specication, the dependent variable is
a dummy indicating whether the message had two elements. We refer to this regression as
"Two." In contrast to the two binary logistic regressions above, in the third specication we
run an ordered multinomial logistic regression. In this specication, the dependent variable is
the number of elements in the message. In other words, we assign a value of 0 for the empty
message, a value of 1 for the messages "High" or "Low" and 2 otherwise. We refer to this
regression as "Number of Elements."
In each of the regressions below, we include controls for the state because it is not obvious,
given a particular communication cost, that a message would be appropriate for all states. We
accomplish this by including dummy variables indicating the state. Further, for all regressions
10Here, as we do in the following sentence, we report the p-value of the period coe¢ cient in an OLS regression
with the senders payo¤s as the dependent variable and the period as the independent variable.
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below, we account for the subject-specic xed-e¤ects. Note that in the regressions below,
the communication costs enter linearly rather than as a categorical variable. Communication
costs enter linearly into the senders payo¤s and therefore this would seem to be the most
natural specication. We summarize the analysis below in Table 1.
Table 1-Size of Language and Communication Costs
One or Two Two Number of Elements
Communication Costs  0:0401  0:0140  0:0195
(0:00743) (0:00553) (0:00405)
-2 log L 412:8 812:1 1365:2
LR 2 796:3 548:3 924:3
Results of logistic regressions where ** indicates signicance at p < 0:01 and *
indicates signicance at p < 0:05. Each regression accounts for the subject-specic
xed-e¤ects and state dummy variables and has 1056 observations from 24 senders
in 4 rounds of 11 periods. We do not list the estimations of intercepts.
In each of our three specications, we nd evidence that the size of the language is
a¤ected by the communication costs. In other words, we nd that more expensive signals
are conserved when communication becomes costly. In the rst specication, we see that
higher communication costs are associated with a lower likelihood of sending a message with
one or two elements. We see the analogous result in the second specication: there is a
negative relationship between communication costs and the transmission of a message with
two elements. Finally, in the third specication we see that higher communication costs are
associated with the transmission of lower cost messages. In short, the results summarized in
Table 1 suggest that the size of the language used arises endogenously as a function of the cost
of communication. Note that this result, and the similar results which follow, are surprising
because the equilibrium predictions of the c = 30 and 50 treatments are identical.11
As a robustness check, we perform a similar analysis, but include the average payo¤s
entering the period, within the current match. We summarize the analysis below in Table 2.
11Despite these equilibrium predictions, the previous analysis when restricted to c = 30 or 50, shows that
communication costs are signicantly related to the size of the language. These results are available from the
corresponding author upon request.
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Table 2-Size of Language and History in Match
One or Two Two Number of Elements
Communication Costs  0:0467  0:0147  0:0223
(0:00806) (0:00594) (0:00421)
Average Payo¤s 0:00868 0:00422 0:00498
(0:00352) (0:00181) (0:00160)
Costs-Average Payo¤s Interaction  0:000127  0:000048  0:000069
(0:000059) (0:000039) (0:000030)
-2 log L 406:4 806:0 1355:4
LR 2 802:7 554:3 934:1
Results of logistic regressions where ** indicates signicance at p < 0:01 and
* indicates signicance at p < 0:05. Each regression accounts for the subject-
specic xed-e¤ects and a dummy for each state. We do not list the estimates
of the intercepts and each regression has 1056 observations from 24 senders in 4
rounds of 11 periods.
We rst note that the qualitative ndings from Table 1 also hold here in Table 2: the
senders are conserving higher cost messages when communication is costly. The new insight
which emerges is that we observe that higher average payo¤s are associated with transmission
of more expensive messages, in each of the three specications. We also note that there is
evidence that the average prot and the communication costs are interacting. Specically, we
nd that higher communication costs are associated with a lower sensitivity of the relationship
between average payo¤s and the likelihood of sending an empty or a less costly message.
The results of the regressions summarized in Table 2 suggest that senders are jointly
considering the communication costs and the average payo¤s obtained in the match when
deciding on the size of the language. In particular, it seems that the senders are weighing
whether the costs of the messages are less than their benets. This determination is based
on both the direct cost incurred by sending the message and the prociency of the receiver in
selecting the appropriate action.
5.3 Payo¤s Relative to Equilibrium Payo¤s
We now turn our attention to the overall performance of the subjects, as measured by their
payo¤s. This allows us to ask, how are the subjects performing relative to the equilibrium
predictions. We rst note that the equilibrium predictions do not perform particularly well.
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We perform a test of the di¤erences between the equilibrium payo¤s and the actual payo¤s
within each communication cost treatment. Within each treatment, we nd a signicant dif-
ference between the senders payo¤s and the equilibrium prediction. In all but the highest cost
treatment, there is a signicant di¤erence between the receivers payo¤s and the equilibrium
prediction. This analysis is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3-Equilibrium Payo¤s and Actual Payo¤s
Sender Receiver
Equilibrium Actual Equilibrium Actual
c = 10 85:71 67:13 100:00 81:03
c = 30 72:29 47:16 89:43 84:09
c = 50 60:86 29:60 89:43 76:00
c = 96 40:57  6:14 68:00 69:86
Results of paired t-tests each with 263 degrees of freedom, where ** indicates
signicance of a two-sided test at p < 0:01. Each cell is associated with 264
observations from 24 subjects across 11 periods.
Recall that the receivers payo¤s correspond to the accuracy of the receivers action and the
senders payo¤s correspond to this accuracy minus the cost of the message sent. A glance at
Table 3 suggests that as communication costs increase, the receivers are doing better relative
to their equilibrium payo¤s and yet the senders are doing worse relative to their equilibrium
payo¤s. In particular, Table 3 seems to suggest that the di¤erence between the senders actual
and equilibrium payo¤s is increasing in the cost of communication. Further, the di¤erence
between the receivers actual and equilibrium payo¤s are decreasing in the cost of communi-
cation. This is consistent with the contention that the senders are overcommunicating and
the receivers are beneting from this overcommunication. We perform the following analysis
in order to more carefully test this speculation.
In regressions (S1)  (S4) of Table 4, the dependent variable is the senders actual payo¤s
minus the senders equilibrium payo¤s. In regressions (R1)  (R4) of Table 5, the dependent
variable is the receivers actual payo¤s minus the receivers equilibrium payo¤s. In regressions
(S1) and (R1), we employ no additional controls. In regressions (S2) and (R2), we account for
the subject-specic xed-e¤ects. In regressions (S3) and (R3), we account for the information
known by the subject at the time of the decision. In the case of the receiver (R3), this is the
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message observed, and in the case of the sender (S3), this is the state observed. Finally, in
regressions (S4) and (R4) we account for the subject-specic xed-e¤ects and the information
known by the subject at the time of the decision.
Again note that in the regressions below, the communication costs enter linearly rather
than as a categorical variable. This is because the senders payo¤s are linear in the cost of
communication and the receiver is aware of this linear relationship. Further, we account for
a possible nonlinear relationship between communication costs and behavior by subtracting
the equilibrium payo¤s from the actual payo¤s. We summarize this analysis in Tables 4 and
5.
Table 4-Senders Payo¤s Minus Equilibrium Payo¤s
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
Intercept  15:2  11:5  27:9  22:6
(2:81) (10:2) (4:59) (9:75)
Communication Costs  0:327  0:335  0:320  0:321
(0:0497) (0:0819) (0:0455) (0:0726)
Subject Fixed E¤ects No Y es No Y es
State Dummies No No Y es Y es
R2 0:04 0:23 0:21 0:40
Results of regressions where the dependent variable is the senders actual pay-
o¤s minus senders equilibrium payo¤s, and ** indicates signicance at p < 0:01
and * indicates signicance at p < 0:05. Each regression has 1056 observations
from 24 senders in 4 rounds of 11 periods.
Table 5-Receivers Payo¤s Minus Equilibrium Payo¤s
(R1) (R2) (R3) (R4)
Intercept  18:4  40:2 0:374  17:5
(1:88) (7:90) (3:97) (8:61)
Communication Costs 0:203 0:388 0:212 0:351
(0:0333) (0:0553) (0:0342) (0:0546)
Subject Fixed E¤ects No Y es No Y es
Message Dummies No No Y es Y es
R2 0:03 0:21 0:09 0:26
Results of regressions where the dependent variable is the receivers actual
payo¤s minus receivers equilibrium payo¤s, and ** indicates signicance at p <
0:01 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:05. Each regression has 1056 observations
from 24 receivers in 4 rounds of 11 periods.
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First, note that in Table 4, every specication involving communication costs has a nega-
tive and signicant estimate. This suggests that as communication costs increase, the senders
do worse relative to the equilibrium predictions. We note the opposite e¤ect for the receivers.
Table 5 shows that the estimates of the coe¢ cient for communication costs are positive and
signicant. Therefore, as the communication costs increase, the receivers do better relative
to the equilibrium predictions.
In our view, the results of Table 4 are not consistent with an equilibrium selection expla-
nation. Most notably, if c > 10 then there does not exist an equilibrium where a message
with two elements is sent. However, we often see senders transmitting such messages despite
their high cost.12 It is this overcommunication which appears to be driving the results above.
The results summarized in Tables 4 and 5 provide evidence that the senders are overcom-
municating. In other words, the senders are not su¢ ciently conserving expensive messages
and as a result, there is a negative relationship between communication costs and sender
payo¤s relative to equilibrium payo¤s.
5.4 Another Look at Overcommunication
The questions are then, how robust is the nding that senders are overcommunicating, and is
the positive relationship between communication costs and receiver payo¤s relative to equi-
librium payo¤s caused by the receivers making better decisions or are they merely beneting
from the overcommunication of the senders.
To answer these questions we run a series of discrete choice multinomial logits.13 For the
sender we estimate Sc , where pm0(s; c) is the probability of transmitting message m
0 given
state s and communication cost c:
pm0(s; c) =
e
S
c  um0 (s;c)P
m2M e
S
c  um(s;c)
: (3)
12See Appendix B.
13Note that we are not performing a quantal response equilibrium analysis (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998).
Quantal response equilibrium seems to not be appropriate since we nd evidence that the senders are becoming
less strategic as communication costs increase, and there is evidence of the opposite for receivers. Quantal
response equilibrim would not be able to provide evidence regarding this.
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In expression (3), the term um0(s; c) is the observed expected sender payo¤s by sending message
m0 when the state is s are communication costs are c. We calculate um0(s; c) by noting the
observed relationship between the actions of the receiver upon observing message m0, in all
matches. Note that better decisions on the part of the senders are associated with larger Sc .
For the receiver, we estimate Rc , were qa0(m; c) is the probability of selecting action a
0
given message m and communication cost c:
qa0(m; c) =
e
R
c  ua0 (m;c)P
a2A e
R
c  ua(m;c)
: (4)
In expression (4), the term ua0(m; c) is the observed expected payo¤s for the receiver by
selecting action a0, when the message is m and communication costs are c. We calculate
ua0(m; c) by noting the observed relationship between the message transmitted by the sender
upon observing state s, in all matches. Note that better decisions on the part of the receivers
are associated with larger Rc . In Table 6 below, we present a summary of our estimates.
Also note that we estimate a single  for each condition, rather than an estimate for each
subject within each condition. The latter would require a calculation of expected payo¤s
for each subject, however these would be poorly dened due to empty cells. For instance,
consider the calculation of the expected value of sending a message m given state s. If the
particular subject never sent message m, then it is not possible to calculate the expected
payo¤ for sending message m. It is for this reason that these estimates are across all subjects.
Table 6-Multinomial Choice Estimates
Sender Receiver
c = 10 0:03418 0:0609
(0:00224) (0:00456)
c = 30 0:02745 0:0665
(0:00173) (0:00500)
c = 50 0:02621 0:0520
(0:00169) (0:00364)
c = 96 0:01443 0:0455
(0:0008975) (0:00345)
Maximum likelihood estimates of multinomial logistic choice parameter in ex-
pressions (3) and (4), with standard errors in parentheses. The estimate within
each cell is based on 264 observations from 24 players in 11 periods.
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Table 6 presents evidence that the quality of the best responses to the distribution of
the play of the opponents is negatively related to the communication costs. The sender
estimates in Table 6 corroborate the evidence found in Table 4, namely that the senders are
making worse decisions as communication becomes costly. On the other hand, the receiver
estimates in Table 6 suggest that the positive relationship between receiver payo¤s relative to
equilibrium payo¤s and communication costs is not due to better decision making, but rather
that the receivers are beneting from the overcommunication of the senders.
5.5 Coordination Imperfections and Labels
Finally, we investigate the relationship between coordination and the experimental labels.
One might expect that the ability to coordinate would not depend on the labels of the states.
Here we investigate whether there is evidence that the labels are related to the coordination
outcomes.
In the analysis which follows, we use a coordination dummy variable as the dependent
variable.14 This coordination dummy will attain a value of 1 if the sender and receiver coor-
dinated according to a minimum precision. For instance, we rst investigate the coordination
outcomes when c = 10. In this case, we would expect that subjects would fully coordinate.
Therefore we consider the coordination thresholds of UR = 100 (perfect coordination) and
UR  94 (where the action is within 0:5 of the state).
Since the state is an unordered categorical variable, and it is the primary focus of the
remaining analysis, we present the Wald 2 statistic of each variable in the tables below. In
the analysis below, we include a repeated dummy variable, where a 1 indicates that the state
has been repeated within the match, and a 0 otherwise. We also include the Number of
Elements variable. Note that for the remaining analysis, we include the data from all periods
because we are interested in all data in which subjects attained a minimum coordination. The
analysis for c = 10 is summarized in Tables 7 and 8.
14We provide a summary of these coordination outcomes in Appendix C.
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Table 7-Coordination of UR = 100 where c = 10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State 44:92 47:43 44:74 50:65
Repeated   10:15 10:15 8:44
State-Repeated Interaction     1:16 1:56
Number of Elements       8:97
-2 log L 442:360 431:90 430:71 421:37
LR 2 44:92 51:14 49:78 55:59
Results of logistic regressions where subjects coordinated on an outcome of
UR = 100 for c = 10 where ** indicates signicance at p < 0:01. Each regression
has 360 observations, from 24 subjects in 15 periods. The Wald 2 statistics are
listed listed.
Table 8-Coordination of UR  94 where c = 10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State 36:72 39:74 36:36 41:34
Repeated   9:62 9:22 7:81
State-Repeated Interaction     3:48 3:76
Number of Elements       8:76
-2 log L 412:65 402:785 399:04 389:93
LR 2 36:72 43:194 41:22 46:88
Results of logistic regressions where subjects coordinated on an outcome of
UR  94 for c = 10 where ** indicates signicance at p < 0:01. Each regression
has 360 observations, from 24 subjects in 15 periods. The Wald 2 statistics are
listed listed.
The results of Tables 7 and 8 suggest, despite that full communication is predicted on all
states, the ability of subjects to coordinate is a¤ected by the state. Also the results of Tables
7 and 8 provide evidence that the repeated variable is signicantly related to coordination. In
particular, there is evidence that subjects are better able to coordinate if the state has already
occurred in the match. Perhaps surprisingly, there is not a signicant relationship between
coordination and the interaction variable. Finally, we note that the number of elements
variable is signicant. That is, despite that we expect to observe coordination on each state,
the number of elements in the message sent is related to coordination.
The analysis summarized in Tables 7 and 8 suggests that subjects are a¤ected the labels of
the states and the messages for the case of c = 10. We now perform a similar analysis for the
case of c = 30 and 50. In each state, the equilibrium behavior would imply that the receiver
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would obtain a payo¤ of at least UR = 75. Therefore, we set the coordination threshold to
be UR  75 (where the action is within 1 of the state).
Table 9-Coordination of UR  75 where c = 30 and 50
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State 16:14 16:01 17:89 17:80
Repeated   13:89 12:96 13:03
State-Repeated Interaction     14:26 13:78
Number of Elements       3:42y
-2 log L 614:83 600:70 583:59 580:17
LR 2 16:14 29:14 34:85 38:14
Results of logistic regressions where subjects coordinated on an outcome of
UR  75 for c = 30 and 50, where ** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, * indicates
signicance at p < 0:05, and y indicates signicance at p < 0:1. Each regression
has 720 observations, from 24 subjects across 2 rounds of 15 periods. The Wald
2 statistics are listed listed.
As in the analysis summarized in Tables 7 and 8, we again observe that the state is related
to the ability to coordinate. Further, we again see that the repeated variable is signicant.
However, unlike the results found in Table 7 and 8, we nd that the interaction term is
signicant. In particular, it seems that the e¤ect on coordination of having a state within
a match can vary among the states. In summary, the analysis summarized in Tables 7-9
suggests that the relationship between the experimental labels and success at coordination is
robust across di¤erent experimental treatments.
6 Conclusions
We report on an experiment where the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe
the state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing
the complexity or elaborateness of the message. The incentives of the players are aligned in
that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the
receivers action. Although the equilibrium predictions of Hertel and Smith (2012) do not
perform particularly well, our experimental results do corroborate some of the qualitative
predictions. In particular, we nd that the size of the language emerges endogenously as a
function of the cost of communication.
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Further, the di¤erences between our observations and the equilibrium predictions are con-
sistent with other experimental communication papers: the senders overcommunicate. As
a result of this overcommunication, the senders payo¤s relative to equilibrium payo¤s are
decreasing in the cost of communication. The receivers benet from this overcommunication,
as we observe that their payo¤s relative to equilibrium payo¤s are increasing in the cost of
communication. This conclusion is also supported by a discrete choice multinomial analysis
which nds evidence that the quality of the receivers best responses are decreasing in the cost
of communication.
We also observe coordination imperfections on the basis of the labels of the states and
messages. In particular, subjects in the treatment where full communication is predicted,
are a¤ected by the state on which coordination is sought. Further, we nd a similar result
for the case of intermediate communication costs. To summarize, we nd evidence that the
experimental labels of states and messages a¤ect the ability of subjects to coordinate.
Although to our knowledge, we are the rst paper to examine the experimental implications
of costly and discrete communication, our results could also be of interest to experimental
cheap talk researchers. Sobel (2012) notes that models of costly communication with aligned
preferences can have parallel results to models of costless communication where preferences
are not aligned (or cheap talk models). As a basic prediction of the models, Sobel notes
that increases in communication costs will decrease the quality of communication in a fashion
similar to that in response to increases in the di¤erence of the preferences of sender and receiver
in the cheap talk models. This is precisely what is found in the laboratory. Previous studies
of experimental cheap talk have found that diverging preferences will lead to lower quality
communication. We nd the analogous e¤ect for increases in communication costs.
Although there are signicant di¤erences between the equilibrium predictions and our
observations, we are encouraged by our results. As mentioned, these di¤erences are largely due
to the overcommunication of the senders. Since observing overcommunication in experimental
settings is common, we do not nd this divergence to be problematic. Further, the main
insights from Hertel and Smith (2012) are observed in our experimental setting: the size of
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the language employed is determined by the cost of communication. As a result, it would
seem to be protable to think more about the theoretical and experimental issues related to
costly and discrete communication.
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Appendix A
Although the payo¤s were specied by equations (1) and (2), the subjects were also presented
with the following table.
Action
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
-3 100 94 74 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-2 75 94 100 94 74 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-1 0 44 75 94 100 94 74 44 0 0 0 0 0
State 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100 94 74 44 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100 94 74 44 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100 94 75
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100
Senders Screen
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Receivers Screen
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Appendix B
Messages sent by the senders given the state observed and the communication costs
c = 10 Messages
E H L L L L H H L H H
 3 1 1 1 31 3 2 0
 2 1 1 21 4 19 1 0
States  1 0 0 16 0 14 3 0
0 34 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 4 14 0 7 18 0
2 1 19 0 1 2 9 3
3 0 9 0 0 0 0 22
c = 30 Messages
E H L L L L H H L H H
 3 0 1 5 26 0 1 0
 2 0 0 27 5 5 3 0
States  1 6 1 10 0 11 2 0
0 27 4 1 0 2 2 0
1 16 7 4 0 6 10 1
2 2 29 0 0 1 11 0
3 0 12 0 0 0 0 26
c = 50 Messages
E H L L L L H H L H H
 3 2 0 23 14 0 0 2
 2 1 1 32 0 3 0 0
States  1 16 0 16 1 7 0 0
0 36 0 2 1 0 0 0
1 18 4 8 1 1 4 0
2 3 29 0 0 2 9 0
3 0 15 1 0 0 0 12
c = 96 Messages
E H L L L L H H L H H
 3 4 2 20 18 1 1 0
 2 8 0 12 1 2 2 0
States  1 20 0 13 2 5 0 0
0 35 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 25 4 3 0 0 5 0
2 13 27 0 1 0 1 0
3 5 18 0 0 0 0 16
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Action selected by the receivers given the message and the communication costs
c = 10 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 1 0 0 0 0 0
H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 22 7 2
L 3 2 19 11 6 3 1 1 6 1 0 0 0
Messages L L 30 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
L H 3 3 14 4 10 1 1 0 6 3 0 1 0
H L 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 15 7 6 0 0
H H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 21
c = 30 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
E 0 0 0 0 0 2 49 0 0 0 0 0 0
H 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 8 22 17 3
L 2 6 20 9 6 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0
Messages L L 28 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
L H 0 0 4 1 11 1 1 0 5 0 2 0 0
H L 0 0 4 1 2 0 2 0 9 4 7 0 0
H H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 26
c = 50 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
E 0 1 2 0 1 2 59 5 4 1 1 0 0
H 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 15 15 8
L 6 12 16 18 20 2 2 0 3 3 0 0 0
Messages L L 14 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
L H 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0
H L 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 7 1 0
H H 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
c = 96 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
E 3 4 1 7 4 4 58 8 8 6 4 1 2
H 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 17 9 16
L 11 6 12 3 8 1 0 0 5 0 0 2 0
Messages L L 18 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
L H 0 0 1 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
H L 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 1 1 0 0
H H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
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Appendix C
A summary of the coordination outcomes. Note that Periods 1-15 are included in the tables
below.
c = 10 Messages
E H L L L L H H L H H UR = 100 Total
 3 0 0 0 31 2 0 0 33 50
 2 0 0 13 0 12 1 0 26 59
States  1 0 0 3 0 10 3 0 16 44
0 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 51
1 0 0 4 0 1 18 0 23 66
2 0 16 0 0 0 3 0 19 45
3 0 3 0 0 0 0 30 33 45
c = 10 Messages
E H L L L L H H L H H UR  94 Total
 3 0 0 0 33 2 0 0 35 50
 2 0 0 22 1 15 1 0 39 59
States  1 0 0 6 0 13 3 0 22 44
0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 51
1 0 2 4 0 3 20 0 29 66
2 0 22 0 0 1 8 2 33 45
3 0 7 0 0 0 0 32 39 45
c = 30 Messages
E H L L L L H H L H H UR  75 Total
 3 0 0 7 33 0 1 0 41 49
 2 0 0 33 5 6 3 0 47 56
States  1 8 1 10 0 13 2 0 34 40
0 39 0 0 0 1 1 0 41 48
1 16 8 2 0 5 11 0 42 53
2 0 37 0 0 3 13 0 53 57
3 0 15 0 0 0 0 37 52 57
c = 50 Messages
E H L L L L H H L H H UR  75 Total
 3 0 0 20 16 0 0 2 38 50
 2 0 1 40 0 1 0 0 45 56
States  1 17 0 19 0 7 0 0 43 56
0 51 0 3 0 0 0 0 54 60
1 22 2 3 0 0 4 0 31 55
2 1 39 0 0 3 10 0 53 58
3 0 16 0 0 0 0 15 31 36
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